Rohingya moslemid Myanmaris

Vaatamata 2016. aastal Myanmaris (Birmas) moodustatud uue demokraatlikult valitud valitsuse moodustamisele, mida juhib Nobeli rahupreemia laureaadi Aung San Suu Kyi Demokraatlik Rahvusliit, oli olukord riigi taga kiusatud moslemi vähemuse, mida tuntakse rohingjadena, kohutavana. Näitamaks oma pühendumust probleemidele lahenduse leidmisele, määras valitsus 2016. aasta augustis ÜRO endise peasekretäri Kofi Annani juhtima nõuandekomisjoni, kes viib läbi hinnanguid ja annab soovitusi.

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Kes on rohingjad?

Mõistet Rohingya kasutati tavaliselt, eriti rahvusvahelises meedias, moslemite kogukonna tähistamiseks, kes olid üldiselt koondunud Myanmari Rakhine'i (Arakaani) osariigi kahte põhjapoolsesse asulasse, ehkki neid võis leida ka riigi teistes osades ja riiki kui ka põgenikelaagreid Bangladeshis. Arvatakse, et rohingjad moodustasid umbes ühe kolmandiku Rakhine'i osariigi elanikkonnast ning ülejäänud kaks kolmandikku moodustavad Rakhine budistid.

Mõiste Rohingya kasutamine oli Myanmaris väga vaieldav. Rohingya poliitilised juhid on väitnud, et nende oma on eraldiseisev etniline, kultuuriline ja keeleline kogukond, mis jälgi oma esivanemaid juba 7. sajandi lõpus. Laiem budistlik elanikkond lükkas aga rohingya terminoloogia üldiselt tagasi, viidates neile pigem bengali keeles, ja pidas kogukonda suuresti illegaalseks sisserändajaks tänapäeva Bangladeshist. 2014. aasta rahvaloenduse ajal, mis viidi läbi 30 aasta jooksul, otsustas Myanmari valitsus 11. tunni pärast mitte loetleda neid, kes tahtsid end samastada Rohingyaga, ja loendada ainult neid, kes nõustusid bengali klassifikatsiooniga. See samm oli vastus Rakhine budistide poolt ähvardatud loenduse boikoteerimisele.Selle protsessi käigus kinnitas valitsus oma varasemat lubadust järgida rahvusvahelisi loendusstandardeid.

As with the rest of Myanmar’s postindependence borderlands that were historically multiethnic and politically fluid, Rakhine state had also suffered from decades of centre-periphery imbalances. On the one hand, Buddhist Rakhines had long felt oppressed by the Burmans, the country’s largest ethnic group, and on the other hand, they perceived the Muslim population to be a palpable threat to their cultural identity. Within the Myanmar context, race and ethnicity were rigid constructs that determined legal, political, and social relations. The debate surrounding the Rohingya terminology had, as such, paralyzed meaningful government recognition of the predicament of the Rohingya community.

Statelessness.

Almost all Rohingya in Myanmar were stateless. They were unable to obtain “citizenship by birth” in Myanmar because the 1982 Citizenship Law did not include the Rohingya on the list of 135 recognized national ethnic groups. The law had historically been arbitrarily applied in relation to those, such as the Rohingya, who did not fall strictly within the list of recognized ethnic nationalities. The legal status of a large majority of Rohingya was rendered even more precarious when Pres. Thein Sein unexpectedly announced in February 2015 the expiry of “white cards,” a form of temporary identity documentation held by many within the Rohingya community.

Intercommunal Violence and Displacement.

Two waves of intercommunal violence between Buddhist and Muslim communities in Rakhine state in June and October 2012 led to the displacement of approximately 140,000 people—the large majority of whom were Rohingya—to camps around the state capital (Sittwe) and surrounding townships. According to government figures, the conflicts resulted in 192 deaths, 265 injuries, and the destruction of 8,614 homes, with the impact disproportionately borne by Muslim communities. Human Rights Watch, as well as other nongovernmental organizations, claimed that the October 2012 violence was a coordinated campaign targeting the Rohingya.

Legislative Restrictions.

Following the 2012 violence, other developments, including a series of proposed legislative measures (some of which were passed by Myanmar’s parliament), resulted in further restrictions on the limited rights of the Rohingya. Although those developments had a nationwide application, they were understood to affect mostly the Rohingya community.

In September 2014 an amendment to the 2010 Political Parties Registration Law came into force; the legislation effectively disallowed the Rohingya to form and be members of political parties. Less than six months later, the Constitutional Tribunal delivered an opinion that prevented noncitizens from voting in any national referendum. The legal implication of the decision, formalized in June 2015 with amendments to the election laws, was that Rohingya, who were considered noncitizens, would not be allowed to vote in the 2015 general elections, even if they had cast their ballots during the 1960, 1990, and 2010 elections. The development also represented a final and absolute curtailment of the political rights of the Rohingya.

In November 2014 a package of draft laws popularly termed “laws on safeguarding race and religion” was submitted in the parliament for debate. The bills, which were initially proposed in 2013, were to an extent premised on anxieties over Myanmar’s being surrounded by highly populated countries, a factor that was believed to potentially affect the country’s demographics; on fears that Buddhist women were being coerced or tricked into marriages by and with non-Buddhist men; and on stereotypical views that Muslim families were polygamous and that consequently many children were being born. The bills were conceived as a necessary measure to protect Buddhist women and to address the perceived high population growth rate in Rakhine state.

Between May and July 2015, two of the four bills that permitted the state to regulate birth spacing and family planning, as well as to police the practice of religion within multireligious families, were passed by the parliament. The Population Control Healthcare Bill, which was aimed at Muslim women, could potentially be used to force women to space their births at least three years apart.